

Groundedness of infinitary sentences

Chris Laskowski
University of Maryland

Joint work with
Douglas Ulrich and Richard Rast

JMM, 15 January, 2020

URL: Borel completeness and potential canonical Scott sentences, *Fundamenta Mathematicae* **239** (2017), 101-147.

Descriptive set theory of countable models

L **countable**. Let $X_L = \{\text{all } L\text{-structures with universe } \omega\}$.

- X_L Polish via $U_{\varphi(\bar{e})} := \{M \in X_L : M \models \varphi(\bar{e})\}$ clopen for all $\varphi, \bar{e} \in \omega^n$.
- $S_\infty = \text{Sym}(\omega)$ acts on X_L via homeomorphisms:
 $\sigma \cdot M \models \varphi(\sigma^{-1}(\bar{e})) \Leftrightarrow M \models \varphi(\bar{e})$.
- For a theory T or $\Phi \in L_{\omega_1, \omega}$, $\text{Mod}_\omega(\Phi)$ is a Borel subset of X_L , **invariant** under the action of S_∞ .
- The **only** Borel, invariant subspaces of X_L are $\text{Mod}_\omega(\Phi)$ for some $\Phi \in L_{\omega_1, \omega}$.

Study the complexity of $\text{Mod}_\omega(T) / \cong_T$ (or $\text{Mod}_\omega(\Phi) / \cong_\Phi$)

Friedman-Stanley: $(\text{Mod}_\omega(\Phi), \cong_{L_1})$ is Borel reducible to $(\text{Mod}_\omega(\Psi), \cong_{L_2})$, $\Phi \leq_B \Psi$, if there is a Borel $f : \text{Mod}_\omega(\Phi) \rightarrow \text{Mod}_\omega(\Psi)$ with $M \cong_{L_1} N$ iff $f(M) \cong_{L_2} f(N)$.

- \cong_Φ is always Σ_1^1 (analytic) [$M \cong N$ iff $\exists f(\dots)$] but sometimes is Borel.

Maximal complexity

Φ is **Borel complete** if $\Psi \leq_B \Phi$ for all $\Psi \in L_{\omega_1, \omega}$.

Examples include graphs, groups, fields, linear orders.

Maximal complexity

Φ is **Borel complete** if $\Psi \leq_B \Phi$ for all $\Psi \in L_{\omega_1, \omega}$.

Examples include graphs, groups, fields, linear orders.

Notes:

- As you strengthen the theory, you shrink the class, making it harder to be Borel complete.
- If Φ is Borel complete, then \cong_Φ is not Borel.

Maximal complexity

Φ is **Borel complete** if $\Psi \leq_B \Phi$ for all $\Psi \in L_{\omega_1, \omega}$.

Examples include graphs, groups, fields, linear orders.

Notes:

- As you strengthen the theory, you shrink the class, making it harder to be Borel complete.
- If Φ is Borel complete, then \cong_Φ is not Borel.

Until recently, only known example of Φ with \cong_Φ non-Borel, but not Borel complete was 'Abelian p -groups' where countable models are characterized by the Ulm invariants.

A first-order example

Ulrich-Rast-L: \cong is not Borel for the first-order, weakly minimal
 $\text{REF}(\text{bin}) = \text{Th}(2^\omega, E_n)_{n \in \omega}$ (where $E_n(\eta, \nu)$ iff $\eta|n = \nu|n$).

A first-order example

Ulrich-Rast-L: \cong is not Borel for the first-order, weakly minimal
 $\text{REF}(\text{bin}) = \text{Th}(2^\omega, E_n)_{n \in \omega}$ (where $E_n(\eta, \nu)$ iff $\eta|n = \nu|n$).

Show: $\text{REF}(\text{bin})$ is not Borel complete.

Strategy for showing non-Borel completeness

- Every **countable** M has a canonical Scott sentence $\text{css}(M) \in L_{\omega_1, \omega}$ characterizing M up to isomorphism among **countable** L -structures. Let $\text{CSS}(\Phi) := \{\text{css}(M) : M \in \text{Mod}_\omega(\Phi)\}$.

Strategy for showing non-Borel completeness

- Every **countable** M has a canonical Scott sentence $\text{css}(M) \in L_{\omega_1, \omega}$ characterizing M up to isomorphism among **countable** L -structures. Let $\text{CSS}(\Phi) := \{\text{css}(M) : M \in \text{Mod}_\omega(\Phi)\}$.
- Every Borel embedding $f : \text{Mod}_\omega(\Phi) \rightarrow \text{Mod}_\omega(\Psi)$ induces an injection

$$f^* : \text{CSS}(\Phi) \rightarrow \text{CSS}(\Psi)$$

Strategy for showing non-Borel completeness

- Every **countable** M has a canonical Scott sentence $\text{css}(M) \in L_{\omega_1, \omega}$ characterizing M up to isomorphism among **countable** L -structures. Let $\text{CSS}(\Phi) := \{\text{css}(M) : M \in \text{Mod}_\omega(\Phi)\}$.
- Every Borel embedding $f : \text{Mod}_\omega(\Phi) \rightarrow \text{Mod}_\omega(\Psi)$ induces an injection

$$f^* : \text{CSS}(\Phi) \rightarrow \text{CSS}(\Psi)$$

for every $\forall[G] \supseteq \forall$.

Credo: Every set X is **potentially countable**, i.e., X is countable in some $\mathbb{V}[G] \supseteq \mathbb{V}$.

Credo: Every set X is **potentially countable**, i.e., X is countable in some $\mathbb{V}[G] \supseteq \mathbb{V}$.

Barwise: Every M (**of any cardinality**) has a canonical Scott sentence $\varphi_M \in L_{\infty, \omega}$ such that for any M, N

$$M \equiv_{\infty, \omega} N \quad \text{if and only if} \quad \varphi_M = \varphi_N$$

Credo #2: Every $\varphi \in L_{\infty, \omega}$ is **potentially in** $L_{\omega_1, \omega}$, i.e.,
 $(\varphi \in L_{\omega_1, \omega})^{\mathbb{V}[G]}$ for some $\mathbb{V}[G] \supseteq \mathbb{V}$.

Groundedness

Credo #2: Every $\varphi \in L_{\infty, \omega}$ is **potentially in** $L_{\omega_1, \omega}$, i.e.,
 $(\varphi \in L_{\omega_1, \omega})^{\mathbb{V}[G]}$ for some $\mathbb{V}[G] \supseteq \mathbb{V}$.

$\Phi \in L_{\omega_1, \omega}$ is **grounded** if, for every $\varphi \in L_{\infty, \omega} \cap \mathbb{V}$ and $\varphi \models \Phi$, if φ has a model in some $\mathbb{V}[G] \supseteq \mathbb{V}$, then φ has a model in \mathbb{V} .

Groundedness

Credo #2: Every $\varphi \in L_{\infty, \omega}$ is **potentially in** $L_{\omega_1, \omega}$, i.e.,
 $(\varphi \in L_{\omega_1, \omega})^{\mathbb{V}[G]}$ for some $\mathbb{V}[G] \supseteq \mathbb{V}$.

$\Phi \in L_{\omega_1, \omega}$ is **grounded** if, for every $\varphi \in L_{\infty, \omega} \cap \mathbb{V}$ and $\varphi \models \Phi$, if φ has a model in some $\mathbb{V}[G] \supseteq \mathbb{V}$, then φ has a model in \mathbb{V} .

If Φ is grounded, let $\|\Phi\| := |\text{Mod}(\Phi) / \equiv_{\infty, \omega}|$ (which may be a proper class).

Groundedness

Credo #2: Every $\varphi \in L_{\infty, \omega}$ is **potentially in** $L_{\omega_1, \omega}$, i.e., $(\varphi \in L_{\omega_1, \omega})^{\mathbb{V}[G]}$ for some $\mathbb{V}[G] \supseteq \mathbb{V}$.

$\Phi \in L_{\omega_1, \omega}$ is **grounded** if, for every $\varphi \in L_{\infty, \omega} \cap \mathbb{V}$ and $\varphi \models \Phi$, if φ has a model in some $\mathbb{V}[G] \supseteq \mathbb{V}$, then φ has a model in \mathbb{V} .

If Φ is grounded, let $\|\Phi\| := |\text{Mod}(\Phi) / \equiv_{\infty, \omega}|$ (which may be a proper class).

Theorem (Ulrich-Rast-L)

If Φ, Ψ are both grounded and $\Phi \leq_B \Psi$, then $\|\Phi\| \leq \|\Psi\|$.

An application

Theorem (Ulrich-Rast-L)

- 1 $REF(bin)$ is grounded.
- 2 If T is weakly minimal, then $|Mod(\Phi)/ \equiv_{\infty, \omega}| \leq \beth_2$, hence $\|REF(bin)\| = \beth_2$.

Corollary (Ulrich-Rast-L)

$REF(bin)$ is not Borel complete. In fact, 'countable sets of countable sets of reals' $\not\leq_B REF(bin)$.

Understanding groundedness

Recall: Φ is grounded if, for any $\varphi \in L_{\infty, \omega} \cap \mathbb{V}$ with $\varphi \models \Phi$, if φ has a model in some $\mathbb{V}[G] \supseteq \mathbb{V}$, then φ has a model in \mathbb{V} .

For $\varphi \in L_{\omega_1, \omega}$, life is good.

Theorem (Karp's Completeness Theorem)

The following are equivalent for $\varphi \in L_{\omega_1, \omega}$:

- 1 φ has a model;
- 2 φ has countable model in X_L ;
- 3 φ does not have any 'formal contradictions';
- 4 $\mathbb{V} \models (\exists M \models \varphi)$ if and only if $\mathbb{V}[G] \models (\exists M \models \varphi)$ for some/every forcing extension $\mathbb{V}[G]$.

Understanding groundedness

Recall: Φ is grounded if, for any $\varphi \in L_{\infty, \omega} \cap \mathbb{V}$ with $\varphi \models \Phi$, if φ has a model in some $\mathbb{V}[G] \supseteq \mathbb{V}$, then φ has a model in \mathbb{V} .

For $\varphi \in L_{\omega_1, \omega}$, life is good.

Theorem (Karp's Completeness Theorem)

The following are equivalent for $\varphi \in L_{\omega_1, \omega}$:

- 1 φ has a model;
- 2 φ has countable model in X_L ;
- 3 φ does not have any 'formal contradictions';
- 4 $\mathbb{V} \models (\exists M \models \varphi)$ if and only if $\mathbb{V}[G] \models (\exists M \models \varphi)$ for some/every forcing extension $\mathbb{V}[G]$.

Thus, witnesses φ to non-groundedness of Φ must be in $L_{\infty, \omega}$ but not $L_{\omega_1, \omega}$.

A non-example

Let $L = \{U_n : n \in \omega\}$ and $T :=$ 'Independent unary predicates'. Say $2^{\aleph_0} = \kappa$ and let $\{s_i : i \in \kappa\}$ enumerate $\mathcal{P}(\omega)$.

$$\delta := \bigwedge T \wedge \bigwedge_{i \in \kappa} \exists! x \left(\bigwedge_{n \in s_i} U_n(x) \wedge \bigwedge_{n \notin s_i} \neg U_n(x) \right)$$

$\delta \in L_{\kappa^+, \omega}$ and has a **unique model** (of size κ).

Baldwin-Koerwein-L For each $k \in \omega$, there is a complete, countable T_k with atomic models of size \aleph_k and no larger.

Baldwin-Koerwein-L For each $k \in \omega$, there is a complete, countable T_k with atomic models of size \aleph_k and no larger. Let $\theta_k := \bigwedge T_k \wedge \bigwedge_{n \in \omega} \forall \bar{x} (\bar{x} \text{ realizes a complete formula})$. Then $\theta_k \in L_{\omega_1, \omega}$ and has models of size \aleph_k but no larger.

Baldwin-Koerwein-L For each $k \in \omega$, there is a complete, countable T_k with atomic models of size \aleph_k and no larger.

Let $\theta_k := \bigwedge T_k \wedge \bigwedge_{n \in \omega} \forall \bar{x} (\bar{x} \text{ realizes a complete formula})$.

Then $\theta_k \in L_{\omega_1, \omega}$ and has models of size \aleph_k but no larger.

Thus, if $\kappa > \aleph_k$, then $\delta \wedge \theta_k$ has no models in \mathbb{V} , but in the Levy collapse $\text{Coll}(\kappa, \aleph_0)$, $\mathbb{V}[G] \models (\delta \wedge \theta_k) \in L_{\omega_1, \omega}$ and has a model.

Baldwin-Koerwein-L For each $k \in \omega$, there is a complete, countable T_k with atomic models of size \aleph_k and no larger.

Let $\theta_k := \bigwedge T_k \wedge \bigwedge_{n \in \omega} \forall \bar{x} (\bar{x} \text{ realizes a complete formula})$.

Then $\theta_k \in L_{\omega_1, \omega}$ and has models of size \aleph_k but no larger.

Thus, if $\kappa > \aleph_k$, then $\delta \wedge \theta_k$ has no models in \mathbb{V} , but in the Levy collapse $\text{Coll}(\kappa, \aleph_0)$, $\mathbb{V}[G] \models (\delta \wedge \theta_k) \in L_{\omega_1, \omega}$ and has a model.

So θ_k is **not grounded** in the vocabulary $\tau_k \cup \{U_n : n \in \omega\}$.

Some positive results

- (Larson-Zapletal) $L = \{E\}$, $T =$ acyclic graphs is grounded.
- (URL) $L = \{E_n : n \in \omega\}$, $REF =$ 'refining equivalence relations' (with arbitrary splitting) is grounded.
- (Kaplan-Shelah) Some classes of linear orders are grounded, but general question remains **Open**.

Good news:

- 1 If T is \aleph_1 -categorical, then T is grounded.
- 2 If Φ is complete (i.e., Φ itself is a Scott sentence) then Φ is grounded.
- 3 If Φ is grounded, then:
 - 1 The Friedman-Stanley jump $J(\Phi)$ is grounded; and
 - 2 If $\Psi \vdash \Phi$, then Ψ is grounded.
- 4 Among $\{\Phi : \cong_{\Phi} \text{ Borel}\}$, the grounded ones and the non-grounded ones are \leq_B -cofinal.

Bad news:

- 1 There are first order, non-grounded T with \cong Borel.
- 2 There exist first order, weakly minimal T that are non-grounded.
- 3 There exist first order, ω -stable T that are non-grounded.
- 4 There are first-order, Borel complete T that **are** grounded (e.g., $\text{REF}(\text{inf})$).
- 5 The sentence θ_1 (in the vocabulary $\tau_1 \cup \{U_n : n \in \omega\}$) is grounded **iff CH holds**.

Thanks for listening!

URL: Borel completeness and potential canonical Scott sentences,
Fundamenta Mathematicae **239** (2017), 101-147.